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DEATH BE NOT PROUD: MEDICAL, ETHICAL
AND LEGAL DILEMMAS IN RESOURCE
ALLOCATION
George P. Smith, H*
Death be not proud, though some have called thee
Mighty and dreadfull, for, thou art not soe,
For, those, whom thou think'st, thou dost overthrow,
Die not, poore death, nor yet canst thou kill mee;
From rest and sleepe, which but thy pictures bee,
Much pleasure, then from thee, much more must flow,
And soonest our best men with thee doe go,
Rest of their bones, and soules deliverie.
Thou'art slave to Fate, chance, kings, and desperate men,
And dost with poyson, warre, and sickness dwell,
And poppie', or charmes can make us sleepe as well,
And better then thy stroake; why swell'st thou then?
One short sleepe past, wee wake eternally,
And death shall be no more, Death thou shalt die.
J. DONNE, Holy Sonnet 167, in THE COMPLETE POETRY OF JOHN
DONNE at 342 (J. Shawcross ed. 1967).
Mother Seton, the Foundress and Patronal Saint of The Sisters of Charity,
taught that "perseverance is a great grace," and that whatever changing
events one passes through, he should act as a Christian.' Indeed, she en-
couraged her sisters to act with purity of intention and to be faithful in cor-
responding to the grace of God.2 She observed that one should suppress all
critical or unkind remarks and-instead-say only those that are kind.3 She
taught that the reward of sacrifice is peace,4 and that the real joy of the soul
is in assisting the poor, visiting the sick, comforting the sorrowful, clothing
* B.S., J.D., Indiana University; LL.M. Columbia University. Professor of Law, Catho-
lic University of America.
Parts of this article were presented as the Rosemary Donley Dedicatory Lecture at The
School of Nursing, Catholic University, Washington, D.C., March 27, 1986.
1. C. WHITE, MOTHER SETON: MOTHER OF MANY DAUGHTERS at x, 226 (1949).
2. Id. at 223.
3. See A Daughter of Charity of St. Vincent de Paul, in THE SOUL OF ELIZABETH SETON:
A SPIRITUAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1936) [hereinafter A Daughter of Charity].
4. M. O'NEIL, MOTHER ELIZABETH ANN SETON 39 (1940).
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the innocents and teaching them the love of God.5 The Sisters of Charity
have been valiant and steadfast as pioneers in education, charity and social
assistance.6
Mother Seton's favorite prayer, and the one which she uttered on her
deathbed was: "May the most just, the most high, the most amiable will of
God be ever loved, adored and accomplished." 7 In Sister Rosemary Don-
ley's work and distinguished record of accomplishment as a Sister of Char-
ity, I suggest that the most amiable will of God is loved, adored and
accomplished with both grace and vigor.
Those with whom Sister Donley associates are enobled and rewarded by
her spirit of selflessness and spiritual tranquility, her abiding faith, her love,
her professional zeal and commitment to excellence, her infectious smile, her
enthusiasm and kind heart, her keen sense of humor, her powerful intellect,
her integrity and her loyalty. In truth, she is the living personification of
what the French term, joie de vivre. It is fitting that we give thanks for
Sister's bountiful harvest at the Nursing School, the University, and within
her profession and her religious community.
I. THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE
Health care costs in the United States have been a source of increasing
concern. Expenditures for health care totalled approximately $287 billion in
1981-this compared, in 1965, with $42 billion.8 In 1983, costs had climbed
to $355 billion.9 Interestingly, as to percentage of the gross national product
consumed by health care expenses, a six percent figure was recorded in 1965
while by 1981, the percentage had increased to 10.8%.10 The average Amer-
ican spent $1,225 for health care in 1981."1
While much of the rise in these costs can be attributed to advances in
medical technology, certain forms of lifesaving treatments are acknowledged
as being the focal points of these increased health costs. More specifically,
approximately $30,000 a year is spent on each patient receiving hemodialysis
treatment-with the 1981 figures showing more than fifty thousand patients
5. A Daughter of Charity, supra note 3, at 64.
6. See D. BAILY, ELIZABETH SETON (1927).
7. A Daughter of Charity, supra note 3, at 93.
8. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH, 1 SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: THE ETH-
ICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE AVAILABILITY OF HEALTH SERVICES 184
(1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
9. Crozier, Data Watch-National Medical Care Spending, 3 HEALTH AFF. 108 (1984).
10. Id. See also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 8.
11. TIME, Aug. 9, 1982, at 42.
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receiving this particular treatment. 12 The cost of each coronary artery by-
pass operation is between $10,000-420,000, and these surgical interventions
account for one percent of the total annual health care budget-with this
one percentage point translating into $2 billion a year.' 3
Two other examples of high budget items in modern medical technology
are to be found in the wide use of computerized tomography or CT scanners
and intensive care units "-particularly in neonatal. 5 Sophisticated neona-
tal care is not only costly, but scarce, with demand often exceeding the sup-
ply of beds, equipment and personnel. What is seen, then, is that physicians
and hospitals are oftentimes being forced to choose which newborns receive
intensive care and which ones do not.16 Decisions of this nature-in turn-
involve a plethora of medical, moral, legal and economic problems-with
the central most issue being how to best distribute scarce neonatal intensive
care resources.
Rosemary Donley has observed that because of these escalating health
care costs-exaggerated as such by technological advances-the success of
medical science will require more clinical judgment. In former days, Profes-
sor Donley stated:
[P]atients died during therapeutic heroics. Lack of science and the
virulence of disease were fatal combinations. Today, the level of
science requires not a painful prescription but rather an informed
judgment about the merits, efficacy, benefits and desirability of
available and experimental treatments. The power of our knowl-
edge has advanced to the point where the treatment might work.
[Accordingly], modern clinicians balance not only the cost to the
client (and the system), but also the risk to the patient (and the
system). Clinicians must make decisions based on the probability
that treatment might restore life and health, albeit compromised.
We have given clients new, more painful and more costly ways to
live and die. Justice mandates that decisions about access to health
12. Evans, Blagg & Bryan, Implications for Health Care Policy: A Social and Demo-
graphic Profile of Hemodialysis Patients in the United States, 245 J. A.M.A. 487, 490 (1981).
See also Note, Scarce Medical Resources, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 620 (1969).
13. Randall, Coronary Artery Bypass Surgery, 12 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 13, 14 (Feb.
1982).
14. Mehlman, Rationing Expensive Lifesaving Medical Treatments, 1985 Wis. L. REV.
239, 240.
15. See Smith, Quality of Life, Sanctity of Creation: Palliative or Apotheosis?, 63 NEB. L.
REV. 709 (1984).
16. Smith, Triage: Endgame Realities, 1 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 143 (1985);
see also Childress, Triage in Neonatal Intensive Care: The Limitations of the Metaphor, 69 VA.
L. REV. 547 (1983).
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care should consider benefit as well as cost.
17
In traditional therapeutic equations, cost of care was ignored.' 8 Today,
however, it is the significant and perhaps overriding variable in the Brave
New World that, in reality, is already here. "Return on equity is the out-
come," Donley states, "and management of costs is the strategy that drives
the new system."' 9 Health care professionals must, of necessity, include cost
in their decisional paradigms. Sadly, I find myself in total agreement with
Professor Donley, when she concludes that "failure to use the best available
information, an irresponsible use of power, has brought us to the place
where health care is a commodity to be purchased and professional judg-
ment is mediated by arbitrary financial standards."2°
More and more, then, the central question of from whom will people seek
care in decentralized health systems2 becomes tied to the simple reality of
their financial backgrounds and their medical salvageability as a conse-
quence of their treatment using scarce medical resources. Modern principles
of triage 22 and cost-benefit analysis dictate, in reality, the extent to which a
definitive response can be given to the question of how contemporary and
decentralized health systems respond to the needs of an equally contempo-
rary society.23
Both the thesis and the major conclusion of this Article are identical and
state-very simply-that no matter what physicians, lawyers, judges, nurses,
social welfare workers, philosophers or ethicists posit re the structuring and
validation of treatment or non-treatment of individuals in irreversible comas
and irreversibly handicapped newborns, the final reality of decisionmaking is
tied to a complex balancing test of weighing economic costs of non-mainte-
nance against the social benefits of maintenance. Stated another way, deci-
sions of this scope and dimension are reached by balancing the gravity of the




20. Id. at 52. It has been suggested that as to medical cost control, greater patient choice
would have the effect of bringing about a very significant reduction in actual health care con-
sumption. Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95
YALE L.J. 219, 295 (1985).
21. See Donley, A Social Mandate for Nursing. Prescription for The Future, 1 J. CON-
TEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'y 39, 44 (1985).
22. Smith, supra note 16. See generally R. Fox & J. SWAZEY, THE COURAGE To FAIL
(1974); G. SMITH, GENETICS, ETHICS AND THE LAW (1981).
23. Donley & McCarthy, Technology: Enemy of Ally in Pursuit of Justice, in CHRISTIAN
PERSPECTIVE ON JUSTICE IN HEALTH CARE 11 (M. Kelly ed. 1984). See generally G. CALA-
BRESI, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978) (with P. Bobbit).
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economic harm that will accrue in a particular case of maintenance against
the utility of the social good that will occur for non-maintenance.
II. CONTEMPORARY AMBIGUITIES
There is a shifting and, indeed, ambiguous line between doing everything
medically possible to prolong a meaningful (i.e., qualitative) life and doing
no more than is considered necessary to maintain comfort and avoid a pro-
longation of the dying process. And, regrettably, the parameters of this line
are not universally taught in American medical schools. Rather, the degree
of aggressiveness of treatment to be followed is left generally to both the
accumulated experience as well as the basic personality of individual doc-
tors, together with their consultations with peers and the patient in distress
and his family.24
In a litigious society, many doctors are restrained in their use of humane,
yet life-ending modalities of treatment or non-treatment because of the real
fear of malpractice actions being maintained against them. For other physi-
cians, the death of a patient is viewed as a professional failure-with every
means being taken in order to postpone it-even in clear-cut cases of termi-
nal illness and even sometimes against contrary family wishes.25
Dr. Richard B. Freeman of Rochester, New York, commented recently
that although he took the Hippocratic Oath to "do no harm," with the cur-
rent state of advanced medical technology, physicians "can often 'do harm'
by using everything every time."'2 6 Physicians have commonly distinguished
between not saving a life and taking a life. Thus, for example, feeding has
been withheld to hasten death by starvation-but there has been a reluctance
to give medicine to hasten death that, in turn, would if disclosed surely sub-
ject the physician to a criminal charge of murder.2 7
While the physician must be governed by a single-minded purpose to ben-
efit his patient, a prudent sense of proportion as to the means employed must
be maintained.28 Answers can never be clear and precise, however, when
questions are posited of the nature: What makes life not worth living for a
handicapped at-risk newborn or a terminally ill person? Both with child and
adult, alike, it would seem but reasonable to suggest (or even advocate) that
when either suffers from a disease that brings with it uncontrolled levels of
24. Malcom, Fateful Choices-Fatal Illness. How Long to Live, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14,
1986, at 8, col. 3.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Brooks, Ethical Dilemmas in the Treatment of Critically Ill Newborns, I J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 133, 139, 140 (1985).
28. C. RICE, THE VANISHING RIGHT TO LIFE 72 (1969).
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pain and no hope of survival that life should not be prolonged by means of
extraordinary medical measures. What is extraordinary will of necessity
depend upon the facts of the particular case being evaluated and also very
largely upon the judgment (or prognosis) of the attending physician.3 °
In 1957, Professor Glanville Williams of Cambridge University suggested
that when a physician responded-accordingly-to such a decision and ac-
ted in good faith, he should be relieved of all civil and criminal responsibility
for any possible claim that he failed to fulfill his "obligation" to maintain life
or-for that matter-assisted, actively or negligently in promoting one's
death.31 Any test of the measure of good faith would, then, of necessity, be
tied to an evaluation of the costs (medical, economic and social) of maintain-
ing a terminally ill patient versus the benefits of restraint in treatment.32
Thus the question is whether society leaves the ultimate decision to pro-
long or release "life" at its edges to the collected wisdom of physicians based
on a situational standard, or is the rigidified standard of law, that forbids in
all cases the purposeful taking of another's "life" as murder, to be followed
unerringly? I predict that within ten years, as more and more tragic inci-
dents of cruel and unusual punishment through the prolongation of lives
that in reality are neither humane nor human in their form are witnessed,
the law will respond accordingly and allow medical assistance to be rendered
to complete the final burden without civil or criminal sanction.
In August, 1985, the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform
State Laws suggested the adoption of a Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill
Act that would go far to establish recognition of rights of self-determination
for the terminally ill.3 3 Some thirty-six states including Texas have enacted
29. Englehardt, Ethical Issues in Aiding the Death of Young Children, in BENEFICENT
EUTHANASIA 180, 187 (M. Kohl ed. 1975); Englehardt, Euthanasia and Children: The Injury
of Continued Existence, 83 J. PEDIATRICS 170, 171 (1973). Another authority has suggested
that a narrow class of infants may be selected justifiably for non-treatment with a notion of
equal respect for the life of all persons when the conscious existence of those infants in the class
is so greatly diminished that making an investment in their case would appear to reasonable
people to yield no benefits. Additionally, for non-treatment selection to be morally and so-
cially acceptable two considerations must be met: the selection criteria for the non-treatment
must be authoritatively articulated and announced publicly and the physicians and parents
making the decision should follow a specific process for assuring that a given infant falls within
the category of those who may be justifiably selected for non-treatment. Robertson, Substan-
tive Criteria and Procedures in Withholding Care for Defective Newborns, in THE LAW-
MEDICINE RELATION: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATION 217, 221-23 (S. Spicker, J. Healey,
Jr. & H. Englehardt, Jr. eds. 1981).
30. Brooks, supra note 27, at 136; Malcom, supra note 24. See R. MCCORMICK, NOTES
ON MORAL THEOLOGY, 1965 THROUGH 1980 565 (1981).
31. G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE 340 (1957).
32. Id.
33. See Newsletter, Society for The Right to Die, Fall, 1985.
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living will legislation or right to die laws in efforts to preserve the dignity to
those whose death is imminent.
34
As society begins to move in the direction of respecting the autonomy of
decisionmaking at life's end, so-too--do I suggest it should react similarly
to misfortuned beginnings of life; misfortunes best assessed and evaluated by
involved physicians and the family units wherein the real crisis reposes; for it
is these individuals-not a meddlesome government bureaucracy in Wash-
ington-who can best cope with these decisions regarding the edges of life.
Fr. Richard A. McCormick has observed that while every person is of
equal value, not every life is. 35 He suggests that if life is regarded as the
continuation of vital processes but within a persistent vegetative state; and if
value means a good to the concerned individual with equal meaning identi-
cal or the same (especially of treatment), then it is false to suggest that every
34. ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1984); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3210
(1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3801 to -3804 (Supp. 1985); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (Supp. 1986); 1985
CONN. ACTS 85-606 (Reg. Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509 (1983); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 6-2421 to -2430 (Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. § 765.01 to -.15 (1986); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 31-32-1 to -12 (1985 & Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4508 (1985 & Supp.
1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110/2, para. 701-710 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-8-11 to -21 (Burns Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1 to .11 (West Supp. 1986);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28-101 to -109 (1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.1 to .10
(West Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2921 to 2931 (Supp. 1986); MD.
HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (Supp. 1986); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to
-121 (Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010 to .055 (Vernon Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -111 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540 to .690 (1986); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 137-14:1 to -:16 (Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11 (1986); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -322 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101 to 3111 (West Supp.
1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050 to .090 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. 32-11-101 to -110 (Supp.
1986); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-
2-1101 to -1118 (Supp. 1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251 to 5262 (Supp. 1985); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 54 -325.8:1 to :13 (Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010 to
.905 (Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10 (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01 to .15
(West Supp. 1986); Wyo. STAT. §§ 33-26-144 to -152 (Supp. 1986).
Since 1976, twenty-one states have enacted Natural Death Acts: ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to
-10 (1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3801 to -3804 (Supp. 1985); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509 (1983); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 6-2421 to -2430 (Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. § 765.01 to .15 (1986); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (1985 & Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4508 (1985 & Supp.
1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 /2, para. 701-710 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 65-28-101 to -109 (1980); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1985); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11 (1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -322 (1985); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 97.050 to .090 (1985); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon Supp. 1986);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251 to 5262 (Supp. 1984); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-325.8:1 to :13
(Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70. 122.010 to .905 (Supp. 1986); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 154.01 to .15 (West Supp. 1986); Wyo. STAT. §§ 33-26-144 to -152 (Supp. 1986).
35. McCormick, The Quality of Life, The Sanctity of Life, 8 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 30,
35 (Feb. 1978).
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life is, indeed of equal value.3 6 He suggests that what the "equal value"
language is attempting to connote is that unjust discrimination in the provi-
sion of health care and life supports should be avoided.37 Yet, not all dis-
crimination (or inequality of treatment) is unjust.38 Unjust discrimination is
avoided when critical decisionmaking centers upon the benefit to the pa-
tient-even if the particular benefit must be described primarily in terms of a
quality-of-life criteria.
39
There is a time when it is proper to acknowledge that death is not the
greatest evil and, thus, to acquiesce in its victory. While there is a duty to
preserve life, recognition must be made of the fact that death is the door to
eternal life. And it can be wrong for physicians, as well as the family unit, to
turn the very process of dying into a "technological circus."'4 This is, of
course, not a depreciation of the sanctity of life. But rather, it recognizes
that death must come and that-at some point in time-extreme measures
of resistance are neither necessary nor appropriate. 4
On March 15, 1986, the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the
American Medical Association issued a policy on withholding or withdraw-
ing life prolonging medical treatment which will affect the estimated ten
thousand people who are in irreversible comas in institutions around the
country.4 2 In essence, this policy statement maintains that it is ethical for
physicians to withhold "all means of life prolonging medical treatment" in-
cluding water, from patients in irreversible comas. While recognizing the
social commitment of the physician to sustain life and relieve suffering, the
Council advises that when the performance of one duty conflicts with the
other, the physician must act in the best interest of the patient. Thus, in
following a course of treatment for a terminally ill or irreversibly comatose
patient, the physician should determine whether the benefits of treatment
outweigh its burdens and seek to maintain the dignity of the patient at all
times."
The Council states that, for humane reasons, "with informed consent, a
physician may do what is medically necessary to alleviate severe pain, or
36. Id. See also Smith, supra note 15, at 735, 736.
37. Smith, supra note 15, at 735, 736 McCormick, supra note 35, at 30, 35.
38. Smith, supra note 15, at 735, 736; McCormick, supra note 35, at 30, 35.
39. See R. VEATCH, DEATH, DYING AND THE BIOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 3, 5 (1976);
Fletcher, Love is The Only Measure, 83 COMMONWEALTH 427 (1966). See also McCormick,
supra note 35, at 30, 35.
40. C. RICE, BEYOND ABORTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF A SECULAR STATE
119 (1979).
41. Id.
42. Malcolm, Reassessing Care of Dying, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1986, at 1, col. 3.
43. Id.
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cease or omit treatment to permit a terminally ill patient whose death is
imminent to die. However, he should not intentionally cause death."" In
making decisions whether the administration of potentially life-prolonging
medical treatment comports with the best interests of an incompetent patient
who is unable to act in his own behalf, the physician should determine what
the possibility is for extending life under both humane and comfortable con-
ditions. A further determination should be made as to the prior expressed
wishes of the patient and attitudes of the family or those who have responsi-
bility for the custody. According to the policy, even though death may not
be imminent, but a patient's coma is considered to be beyond doubt irrevers-
ible, and there are-furthermore-adequate safeguards in place to confirm
the accuracy of the diagnosis, then, with the concurrence of those who have
responsibility for the care of the patient, it is not to be regarded as unethical
to discontinue all means of life-prolonging medical treatment.4 5
III. PRINCIPLES OF ALLOCATION
The classical definition of triage may be acknowledged as being:
[t]he medical screening of patients to determine their priority for
treatment; the separation of a large number of casualties, in mili-
tary or civilian disaster medical care, into three groups: those who
cannot be expected to survive even with treatment, those who can
recover without treatment, and the priority groups of those who
need treatment in order to survive.46
Even before "triage" found significant application to military or civilian ca-
tastrophes, its root meaning in French-"sorting, picking, grading or select-
ing according to quality"-was subsequently first applied in the English
language to the process of separating wool according to quality and even
later, to the separation of coffee beans into three categories: "best quality,"
"middling" and "triage coffee," with the last consisting of beans which had
been broken and were, thus, the lowest in grade.47 Over the course of time,
the use of triage has been expanded to other situations where it has become,
in actuality, a metaphor for social, economic and even political decisions.4 8
44. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, STATEMENT OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL
AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS (Mar. 15, 1986).
45. Id.
46. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1476 (4th unabr. ed. 1976).
47. Childress, supra note 16, at 549.
48. See D. RUND & T. RAUSCH, TRIAGE 3-10 (1981); G. WINSLOW, TRIAGE AND JUS-
TICE 1 (1982); Smith, supra note 16. See also Duncan, Public Policy and the AIDS Epidemic, 2
J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 169 (1986); Comment, Protecting the Public from AIDS: A
New Challenge to Traditional Forms of Epidemic Control, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
191 (1985).
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Utilitarian v. Egalitarian
Since the law provides at present no uniformly agreed upon principles
which may be applied in order to regulate the allocation of scarce medical
resources, current medical practice draws upon a structure for decisionmak-
ing evolved as such from a number of philosophical and ethical constructs.49
There are five utilitarian principles of application which are operative in the
hierarchy of triage: the principles of medical success; immediate usefulness;
conservation; parental role and general social value.5 ° Translated as such
into decisional operatives, what emerges is a recognition that priority of se-
lection for use of a scarce medical resource should be accorded to those for
whom treatment has the highest probability of medical success, would be
most useful under the immediate circumstances, to those candidates for use
who require proportionally smaller amounts of the particular resource, those
having the largest responsibilities to dependents or those believed to have the
greatest actual or potential general social worth.5' The utilitarian goal is-
simply stated-to achieve the highest possible amount of some good or re-
source.52 Thus, utilitarian principles are also commonly referred to as
"good maximizing strategies." 53
Egalitarian alternatives-contrariwise-seek either a basic maintenance
or a restoration of equality for persons in need of a particular scarce re-
source.54 There are five basic principles utilized here: 1) the principle of
saving no one-thus priority is given to no one because, simply, none should
be saved if not all can be saved; 2) the principle of medical neediness under
which priority is accorded to those determined to be the medically neediest;
3) the principle of general neediness which allows priority to be given to the
most helpless or generally neediest; 4) the principle of queuing where prior-
ity is given to those individuals who arrive first and-finally- 5) the princi-
ples of random selection where priority of selection is given to those selected
by pure chance. 55
To the utilitarian, maximizing utility, and hence what is diffusely referred
to as the "general welfare," are both the primary ground and subject of all
judgments. 56 That which is required in order to maximize utility overall
49. Note, Scarce Medical Resources, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 620 (1969).
50. G. WINSLOW, supra note 48, at 106.
51. Id. at 63-86.
52. Id. at 87.
53. Id. See generally Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 103 (1979).
54. G. WINSLOW, supra note 48, at 106.
55. Smith, supra note 16, at 147. See also G. WINSLOW, supra note 48, at 106.
56. Gewrith, Can Utilitarianism Justify Any Moral Rights?, in ETHICS, ECONOMICS AND
THE LAW 167 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1982).
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may, thus, infringe upon an individual's own entitlements or rights to partic-
ular goods.17 Accordingly, moral rights are either rejected generally or rec-
ognized as certainly not absolute.
5 8
Philosophy and religion may well provide us all with the necessary bal-
ance and direction for life and allow us to develop an ethic for daily living
and a faith as to the future. But in cases of neonatology where law, science,
medicine and religion interact so dramatically, great care must be exercised
in order to prevent inexplicable fears and emotions-oftentimes fanned by
journalistic prophets of the "what if" shock culture-from taking hold of
and thereby blocking powers of rationality and humanness.59 The basic
challenge of modern medicine should be, simply, to seek, promote and main-
tain a level of real, and when the case may dictate, potential achievement for
its user-patients which allows for full and purposeful living.60 Indeed,
man-himself-should seek to pursue decisionmaking responsibilites and
exercise autonomy in a rational manner, guided by a spirit of humanism. He
should seek-further-to minimize human suffering and maximize the so-
cial good. Defining the extent and application of the social good will vary
with the situation of each case, obviously.6 1
57. Id. at 167, 168.
58. Id. at 168. Bentham in effect rejected moral rights generally. H.L.A. Hart, Bentham
on Legal Rights, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 171-201 (2d series A. Simpson ed.
1973).
59. See generally Smith, Intrusions of a Parvenu: Science, Religion and The New Biology,
3 PACE L. REV. 63 (1982); Smith, Uncertainties on the Spiral Staircase. Metaethics and The
New Biology, 41 PHAROS 10 (1978).
60. G. SMITH, supra note 22, at 2, 8.
61. Id. The extent to which social good complements individual potentials for purposeful
living was revealed strikingly in a study of special care nursing treatment of neonates under-
taken at the Yale-New Haven Hospital which was released in 1973 and showed that 14% of
the two hundred ninety-nine deaths recorded during the period of the study-eighteen
months-were related to actions which withheld treatment. The publication of this study initi-
ated a public dialogue and raised issues regarding the treatment of defective newborns or neo-
nates which heretofore had been raised privately by attending physicians, with or without
familial consultation.
In 1975, questionnaires were sent to all members of the Surgical Section of the American
Association of Pediatricians and to all the chairmen of teaching departments of pediatrics in
the United States, as well as to chiefs of divisions of neonatology and to chiefs of divisions of
genetics in the first two groups and 197 from the latter groups returned completed question-
naires. The results showed "broad support" for the propositions that: physicians need not
attempt to maintain the life of every severely impaired newborn simply because the technology
and the skill exists; parents and physicians (in that order) bear the ultimate responsibility for
making decisions regarding the withholding or administration of treatment for handicapped
at-risk newborns; such decisions should be made on the basis of the best medical predictions
regarding longevity and quality of life; under certain "egregious" circumstances physicians
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Seeking a Construct for Decisionmaking
The underlying principle of application should always be to minimize suf-
fering and maximize the qualitative potential for fulfilling human relation-
ships, thereby promoting a purposeful life for the at-risk individual.62 The
extent to which this principle, inquiry or test should be applied depends
solely upon the facts of each situation as it arises to present a problem. To
have an unyielding a priori standard of mandated care for all seriously hand-
icapped newborns, for example, would be unjust not only for the infant, it-
self, and be promotive of undue suffering to it, but equally unjust and harsh
for its parents and present an unreasonably heavy economic burden to soci-
ety for its maintenance and allocation of scarce and expensive medical sup-
port resources and mechanisms. Efforts must always be made to ensure,
however, that if a class is structured and labeled, "disabled," it is drawn as
narrowly as possible and defined as strictly as possible.63 Thus, the overrid-
ing issue, then, is whether a construct can in fact be designed in such a man-
ner as to assist the supervising physicians, the family and their religious
counselors and the state (when involved) in defining the parameters of a
class of non-salvageable defective newborns?
At various times it has been suggested that the capacity for conscious-
could seek judicial intervention in order to effect treatment and, finally, decisions to treat or
not to treat defective newborns were best made on a "case-by-case" or situational basis.
The majority of the members of the medical profession are of the opinion that the autonomy
of the parent-physician relationship should be maintained in this critical area of concern.
Campbell & Duff, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special Care Nursery, 289 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 890 (1973). See also Ellis, Letting Defective Babies Die.- Who Decides?, 7 AM. J. L. &
MED. 393, 399 (1981).
62. Campbell & Duff, supra note 61.
63. Kennedy, Reflections on the Arthur Trial, 59 NEW SOC'Y 13 (1982). The Department
of Health of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia, drafted admission guidelines for neonatal
intensive care units in the State which may be considered not only humane, but economically
efficient. They state that:
1. The triage principle should be adopted in the neonatal intensive care field.
2. Newborn babies weighing more than 750 grams should generally be accepted for treat-
ment unless they are suffering from serious malformations (including some chromosomal ab-
normalities) which will seriously impair their quality of life.
3. Newborn babies who, despite skilled resuscitation and exclusion of reversible problems,
have not attained their own cardiac output after 10 minutes have elapsed should, for humani-
tarian reasons, be carefully considered for triage.
4. Some babies weighing more than 750 grams may subsequently be excluded because of
severe intraventricular hemorrhage or severe brain damage.
5. Infants with severe abnormalities of cardiac and/or respiratory systems (hypoplastic left
heart syndrome, laryngeal and tracheal aplasia) where surgical correction is not feasible should
be considered for triage. NICU Admission Guidelines, Department of Health, New South
Wales, Australia, 1984. See also Lorber, Early Results of Selective Treatment of Spina Bifida
Cystica, 4 BRIT. J. MED. 201 (1973). See generally Smith, Life or Death - Who Decides?, in 7
PROCEEDINGS MEDICO-LEGAL Soc., NEW So. WALES 190 (1985).
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ness, 64 social interaction, human relationships (and especially love)65 and
rational thought were the four most important considerations in determining
who was to be placed in a "non-salvageable" classification. 66 The impor-
tance of each capacity in the hierarchy of the classification depends, very
obviously, upon one's particular social, ethical, religious and philosophical
perspective. One leading ethicist has stated that, "the warmth of human
interaction, the love of one person for another, the emotional bonding that
links people in moral communities does not require a capacity for
consciousness."
67
Balancing Costs and Benefits
The conundrum of seeking to maintain purposeful living yet at the same
time protect the recognition of the very sanctification of life finds reality and
force when dealing with the plight of genetically defective newborns. This
conundrum is also to be recognized as presenting a quality of goals. One
goal is and must be balanced against another in attempting to reach a level of
distributive justice in the hard decision required here. The situational ethic
must be predominant over a harsh, unyielding a priori standard. Viewed
from another perspective, this balancing test underscores recognition of the
fact that human life is, in actuality, but a resource-as are natural, physical
and environmental resources. Thus, the primary goal for the conservation of
every resource is the maximization of its full use or potential-be it viewed
as economic, social, cultural or political. Waste must be avoided. Consid-
ered as such, then, in seeking to maximize the good of this precious resource
of life, the rights of personal autonomy and spiritual awareness are but vec-
tors of forces which must be additionally factored into any balancing equa-
tion. State interest is yet another positive force and also a constraint on
autonomous or, in this area, parental-familial medical decisionmaking.
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When considering the severely defective newborn, the costs to the individ-
ual if maintained vis-a-vis the quality of life and extent of life must be
weighed against not only the side effects on the parents from a social, emo-
tional and economic level, but on the hospital staff in the nursery watching
the infant die and listening to its strangled cries," as well as on society as to
64. Fletcher, Indicators of Humanhood: A Tentative Profile of Man, 2 HASTINGS CENTER
REP. 1 (Nov. 1972).
65. R. McCormick, To Save or Let Die: The Dilemma of Modern Medicine, in How
BRAVE A NEW WORLD 339 (1981).
66. R. VEATCH, A THEORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS 244 (1981).
67. Id. at 245.
68. G. SMITH, supra note 22.
69. Smith, Long Days Journeys Into Night: The Tragedy of The Handicapped At Risk
Infants, in MORAL ISSUES IN MENTAL RETARDATION (R. Laura ed. 1984) [hereinafter Long
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the loss of a young citizen and the potentially dangerous recognition that
death may have for future similarly disposed citizens. Indeed, the goal of
achieving a manageable level of sustenance may well involve incalculable
levels of suffering for both the active and passive participants.7 °
An African Paradigm
The Akamba people of Kenya, Africa, approach the problem of allocating
scarce medical resources in a most interesting manner. For example, where
only one person can be saved, the Akamba would favor an older person over
a younger person-this being in direct contrast with the posture taken in the
United States where the young are prized more highly than the old because
of their economic productivity-or at least their perceived productivity. The
Akamba insist that life is much more than "atomistic sums of individual
economic contributors. '71 Rather, it is viewed as "a social fabric of inter-
personal relations."' 72 Thus, under their philosophy, the more advanced age
a person reaches, the more strongly related that person becomes to the lives
of others and the greater wisdom he shares with the community. This rela-
tionship is thus viewed as a significant social resource.73
Similarly, a man without children would be saved over one with five.
Again, in the United States, an opposite position would be taken-with the
view that for the sake of the children their father should be treated medically
and saved.74 The Akamba maintain "that the man without children faces
annihilation and must be allowed to live so that he can 'raise up a name' for
himself by having children."75
And finally, the Akamba prioritize half-treatments to each of two dying
patients rather than allow one to receive full treatment, even when the rec-
ord of experience indicates that a half-treatment is insufficient to save either
at-risk individual. This they do under their theory of substantive equality.
Days Journeys]; Smith, Defective Newborns and Government Intermeddling, 25 MED. SCI. & L.
44 (1985) [hereinafter Defective Newborns]; Smith, The Plight of The Genetically Handicapped
Newborn: A Comparative Analysis, 9 HOLDSWORTH L. REV. 164 (1984) [hereinafter Handi-
capped Newborns].
70. See Long Days Journeys, supra note 69; Defective Newborns, supra note 69; Handi-
capped Newborns, supra note 69. See also Smith, Lost Horizons, Captains Courageous and
Disabled Newborns: Raging Against The Dying Light, in 1 REPORTS OF THE SEVENTH WORLD
CONGRESS ON MEDICAL LAW 75 (1985); Smith, Handicapped Babies and The Law: The
United States Position, 1984 INT'L LEGAL PRAC. 86.
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In the United States, procedural equality (or, what is commonly acknowl-
edged as equal access) would dictate a course of action where only one per-
son would be saved-all according to a first come, first served principle.7 6
A Distributional Standard
Distributing scarce medical resources involves obvious problems of dis-
tributive justice. Although acknowledged as existing, they are quite difficult
to resolve in a pragmatic manner. Consequently, owing to this often insur-
mountable difficulty, the question of how the distribution will be made is
reduced to the issue of who will make the first order decision. Yet, unless
triage decisions are to be recognized as but arbitrary and capricious, some
critieria must be in place for scrutiny and examination.
The Hemodialysis Program of Seattle, Washington's Artificial Kidney
Center studied eighty-seven such centers around the country in order to de-
velop a set of criteria for allowing patients to be admitted to their programs.
The dialysis candidate profile that emerged found the following criteria to be
used always in the selection and admissions process: medical suitability
(good prognosis with dialysis); absence of other disabling disease; intelli-
gence (as related to understanding treatment); likelihood of vocational reha-
bilitation; age; primacy of application for available vacancy in the
hemodialysis program; and a positive psychiatric evaluation (re acceptance
of the kidney disease and goals of the actual treatment). The following con-
ditions were judged as excluding selection of a patient for participation in the
program: mental deficiency; poor family environment; criminal record; indi-
gency; poor employment record; lack of transportation; and lack of state
residency.7 7
Fault may be found with one or more of these factors used in selection.
But, absent a unifying philosophy of medicine which defines with precision
its goals for achievement, acknowledges whether such achievement is possi-
ble and determines whether it reflects a desirable goal of contemporary
human culture, and develops rational guidelines for making necessary criti-
cal choices, medicine will not be successful.
Today, there is a recognition that an admirable goal of a national health
policy is quality health care at an affordable cost. Cost containment thus has
become a major force of wide significance and application in all levels of
health-care decisionmaking. There is little disputation of the fact that re-
sources are scarce relative to wants and that they have alternative uses; and
furthermore that differences in individual wants mean an assignment of dif-
76. Id.
77. R. Fox & J. SWAZEY, THE COURAGE To FAIL 7, 8 (1984).
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ferent values to these wants. The basic dilemma, then, is where to determine
a line of compromise between competing interest groups.7"
Love As A Construct
From a Judeo-Christian theological perspective, the meaning, the sub-
stance, and-indeed-the consummation of life is tied inextricably to expres-
sions of Love: love of God and love of neighbor. It is through the love of
others that God is recognized and loved. The meaning of life under this
interpretation, then, is to be found in human relationships and the qualities
of respect, concern, compassion, and justice that support such
relationships.7 9
Social justice demands that each individual be given an opportunity to
maximize his individual potential. Yet, a point is often reached where main-
tenance of an individual is in defiance of all concepts of basic humanitarian-
ism and social justice. When an individual's condition is such that it
represents a negation of any "truly human" qualities or relational-potential,
then the best form of treatment should be arguably no treatment at all.8°
Life should not be viewed as an end in and of itself, but rather as some-
thing that should be preserved so that other values can be fulfilled. Life
should be preserved when it holds a potentiality for human relationships.
Although this standard does not admit of mathematical precision and must
be applied with great humility and caution, it is nonetheless a beginning
from which particular medical formulations may be developed. 8'
The concepts of ordinary versus extraordinary life-sustaining processes
are highly relative, not only in time and locale, but also in their application
to individual cases. These concepts in essence serve as value judgments
which determine whether a given modality of treatment poses an undue
hardship on the patient or provides hope for a direct benefit. If a particular
mode of medical or surgical intervention either imposes too great a hardship
on the patient, or offers no reasonable hope of benefit, the treatment could be
correctly viewed as extraordinary and, thus, non-obligatory.8 2
If an act renders more harm than good to the individual in crisis, and to
those around him, the act would properly be viewed as unloving. The
crucial point of understanding is that a basic cost-benefit analysis is almost
always undertaken-consciously or unconsciously. Of course, the method-
78. Smith, supra note 16, at 146.
79. Id. at 149-50.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. See generally Smith, Manipulating The Genetic Code: Jurisprudential Conun-
drums, 64 GEO. L.J. 697 (1976).
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ology utilized in this assessment will be situational and incapable of absolute
determination. Yet of necessity, the basic norm to be used will be that of
love.83
CONCLUSIONS
Life-viewed as a human resource-should be developed and preserved
along those lines which allow for the achievement of its fullest potential for
total economic realization, maximization or productivity. Indeed, human
life-at whatever stage of development or decline-is both a precious and
sacred resource.84 Its initial advancement or abrupt curtailment should be
guided always by a spirit of humanism. Viewed thusly, attainment of the
quality of purposeful, humane living becomes a coordinate or complement to
total economic utility.83
Child protection laws and laws prohibiting murder are, of course, neces-
sary. Their design and promulgation by the government at the state and
federal levels are crucial if standards of equal protection for all of its citi-
zens-regardless of age or physical stature-are to be assured. It is a dan-
gerously thin line to tread between familial privacy in decisionmaking
matters of this nature and government intervention.8 6 The judiciary, when
called upon to evaluate cases of alleged abuse of handicapped newborns, or
murder or euthanasia, can be aided by a close working partnership with the
medical profession in seeking to determine those situations where the with-
holding of needed medical or surgical modalities of treatment would be in
the individual's best interests-as well as all others immediately
concerned. 
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